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The main reason to keep "generic name only" prescribing from becoming a reality, and to keep the antisubstitution laws intact is that one
drug is not the therapeutic or biologic equivalent of another and therefore
a substituted drug could produce undesired effects. Many who agree with
this statement admit that in many cases there would be no harmful effects where the substituted drug is chemically equivalent to the one originally prescribed. However, the fact that there are a few reported cases
where substitution has been harmful, and an indication that more reports
will follow as substitution proliferates, is sufficient grounds for arguing to
keep the federal and state safeguards as they are. Until a therapeutic or
biologic equivalency test can be established, changes in the present laws
would be premature, If in the future a doctor could prescribe a generic drug
with confidence that it would be therapeutically equivalent to the brand
name drug, and that it has been through extensive clinical tests-at that
point a change in the laws should be considered.
If prescription drug prices are indeed too high, then other remedies besides allowing substitution or generic prescribing should be considered
to lower them. It has not been sufficiently proven that the proposed changes
would result in a savings to the consumer. However, even if there was a
savings, as long as there are even a few cases of therapeutic nonequivalency
and the subsequent danger of serious or fatal injury occurring from this
lack of equivalency, the present laws should remain intact.
MICHAEL DANA MASON

Equal Protection in Legislative Apportionment:
A New Double Standard
INTRODUCTION: MALAPPORTIONMENT: INEQUALITY AND
THE INDIVIDUAL'S VOTE
1

In Mahan v. Howell, the Supreme Court gave legal sanction to limited
malapportionment. In this apparent reversal of its prior stance, the Court
in Mahan held, inter alia, that a Virginia statute which apportioned the
House of Delegates by traditional county and city boundaries was valid
93 S. Ct. 979 (1973). The Virginia statute provided for a combination of 52 single-member
multi-member, and floater districts from which 100 delegates were to be elected. 93 S.Ct.
at 980. The term 'floterial district' is used to refer to a legislative district which includes within
its boundaries several separate districts or political subdivisions which independently would
not be entitled to additional representation but whose combined population entitled the entire
area to another seat in the particular legislative body being apportioned. Davis v. Mann,
377 U.S. 675, 686 (1964).
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despite a 16.4% deviation from ideal district populations.' The plaintiffs
had alleged, inter alia, that the variances were an impermissible violation
of equal protection. 3 By contrast, the Court decided that the statute allowing deviations of 16.4% was reasonably related to a rational state policy

of respecting political subdivision boundaries, and, therefore, did not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 Previously, the Court had maintained that the preservation of county lines
in congressional redistricting did not justify relatively small population
variations. Rather, congressional units were to be as equal in population
as was practically possible. 5 Accordingly, it is apparent that the Mahan

decision has created a double standard in the law; certain small deviations
are acceptable in state legislative redistricting, while virtually6 no population
discrepancies are permissible in congressional redistricting.
THE SUPREME COURT CLAIMS JURISDICTION

The creation of legislative districts and the decision of how the pop-

ulation is to be distributed among these districts is in the first instance the
prerogative of the state legislators. The question which logically follows
is, can the Court review legislative apportionment?
In Baker v. Carr,7 the Supreme Court decided that legislative reapportionment was a proper subject for judicial review. 8 The complaint
2 The ideal district in Virginia consisted of 46,585 persons per delegate. The 16th district
with a population of 101,928 was allotted two seats, each of 50,964, and thus was underrepresented by 9.6%. The 12th district had one delegate for a population of 43,319, thus being
over-represented by 6.8%. Howell v. Mahan, 330 F.Supp. 1138, 1139 (E.D. Va. 1971).
3 Id. at 981-82. The suit also attacked the 40 single-member senatorial districts alleging
that the city of Norfolk was unconstitutionally split into three districts, allocating Navy
personnel "homeported" in Norfolk in one district and grouping Negro voters in another
district. Mahan v. Howell, 93 S. Ct. 979, 982 (1973). The Court held that the establishment
of a senatorial district assigned to Navy personnel "homeported" at Norfolk, regardless of
where they resided, was a constitutionally impermissible discrimination against those individuals. Id. at 984. No mention was made by the Court of the alleged discrimination
against black voters.
4 Id. at 980.
5 Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969) and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S.
542, 546 (1969). See notes 32-33 infra.
6 In Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S.Ct. 2321 (1973), the Court allowed minor deviations
(7.83%) without justification in state redistricting. See note 92 infra. In a companion case,
White v. Register, 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973), a deviation of 9.9% in the House was upheld as not
showing a prima facie case of invidious discrimination. For a comprehensive discussion
of the reapportionment issue before Mahan and Gaffney see Note, ReapportionmentNine Years into the Revolution and Still Struggling, 70 MICH. L. REV. 586 (1972).
7 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), the Court had held that
questions of reapportionment laid outside the scope of the courts because of the political
nature of the issue. id. at 553-554. For an excellent discussion of Colegrove and prior cases
see L. R. Caruso, The Rocky Road from Colegrove to Wesberry; or You Can't Get There
From Here, 36 TENN. L. REV. 621 (1969); See also, Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72
YALE L. REV. 7 (1962).
8 Id.
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alleged that the Tennessee Apportionment Act of 1901 violated the

Fourteenth Amendment through the enactment of grossly disproportionate
districts for the voting population, thus placing the plaintiffs in a position
of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality. 9 The Court did not, however,
discuss the merits of the complaint. Rather, it simply stated that the allegation of a denial of equal protection of the laws created a justiciable
controversy. 10
"ONE MAN, ONE VOTE": WESBERRY AND REYNOLDS

The "one man, one vote" principle was initially articulated in Wesberry v. Sanders." This case, which was decided two years after Baker,

dealt with Congressional reapportionment. In striking down a Georgia
apportionment plan due to its discriminatory make-up, the Court decided
that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a Congressional district
is to be worth as much as another's.' 2 Since the Georgia statute diluted
the right to vote for congressional representatives, the decision rested

on Art. I, § 2 of the Constitution. That section states that representatives
are to be chosen "by the People of the several States.'

1 3

The funda-

mental constitutional goal is equal representation for equal number of
people. 14

Reynolds v. Sims,15 decided the same term as Wesberry, dealt with a
similar issue. Alabama had maintained its legislative districts intact since
9 Id. at 187.
10 Id. at 209.
11376 U.S. 1 (1964). See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), which challenged Georgia's
use of the county unit system as the basis for counting votes in the Democratic primary
election for the nomination of United States senator and other statewide offices. The effect
of the system was that one's vote counted less and less as the population of the county increased. The Court held that the equal protection clause required that once a geographical
unit for which a representative was to be chosen was designated, all who participate in the
election must have an equal vote-whatever their race, sex, occupation, or income and
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. The weighing of votes by the county
unit system gave counties having one-third of the total population of the State a clear majority
of county votes. Id. at 369.
12376 U.S. at 8.
13 Id. at 7-8. The majority did not discuss whether the case could have been decided on
fourteenth amendment grounds since the state acted to draw up the districts. Justice Clark,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, felt that the case should have been decided on the
fourteenth amendment because the history and language of Art. 1, § 2 precluded a finding of
"one person, one vote." Id. at 18. It can be inferred from the majority opinion that since
we are dealing with an area where the states were given express power (to choose Representatives) it would be better to decide the case under the Articles of the Constitution than under
state action.
1 Ia. at 18.
15 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Two other cases-Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 675 (1964), and Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964)-were decided on the same day as Reynolds. In these latter
cases, the Court struck down reapportionment plans for Virginia and Delaware respectively.
In Davis, the Court acknowledged Virginia's "tradition of respecting the integrity of the
boundaries of cities and counties in drawing district lines, (which) resulted in the periodic
utilization of floterial districts." 377 U.S. at 686-87. In Roman, the Court recognized that
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1900, with a resulting disparity in some districts of 41 to 1 in electing members to the State Senate, and 16 to 1 in choosing representatives for the
House. 1 6 The plaintiffs alleged a denial of equal protection of the laws,
claiming that the statute of 1900 did not provide for equal representation
and had not provided for such equality in its 60-year existence. 7
Chief Justice Warren, who delivered the opinion of the Court, wrote that
effective participation by all citizens in state government required that
each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of state representatives.' The Court emphasized, however, that exact precision was
not necessary. Most importantly, it indicated, in dicta, that a distinction
could be made between Congressional and State apportionment plans.
A state, the Court said, may maintain the integrity of various political
subdivisions, while at the same time providing for compact districts of
contiguous territory.' 9 This suggestion was based on the premise that
there were usually more seats to be apportioned in state redistricting and
that it might be feasible to use political subdivisions to a greater extent
than would be possible in congressional redistricting. 20 Another consideration, in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, was to insure some voice to political subdivisions, based on the close relationships believed to exist between local governmental entities and the state in basic governmental
operations. 2' The underlying assumption was that state legislation was
often directed to the concerns of political subdivisions. 22 Additionally,
it was the Court's feeling that construction of districts along political subdivision lines might deter the possibility of gerrymandering. 23 Although
deviations would likely result from the aforementioned conditions, the
majority said that a reapportionment scheme need not be in perfect harmony
24
with the equal population principle.
The Reynolds decision was the first indication that more flexibility
might be allowed when certain factors were present in state legislative
reapportionment. These factors, however, would be inapplicable in congressional reapportionment. The citizens in the state system look primarily
minor deviations may occur by using certain factors which are free from arbitrariness of
discrimination. 377 U.S. at 710. For a discussion of the trilogy cases-Baker, Wesberry and
Reynolds, see Comment, A Comprehensive Survey of Redistricting or Reapportionment Law:
State and Federal, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 516 (1965).
16 Id. at 545. The disparity means that one person's senate vote in the most overrepresented
county was worth 41 times more than another person's senate vote in the most underrepresented county.
11 Id. at 540.

20

Id. at 565.
Id. at 578-78.
Id. at 578.

21 Id. at 580.
22
23
24

Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
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to local units for governmental services. To provide these services, state
governments legislate with regard to these specific units in mind. The interests of these individual units, while agreeing on broader national matters, might be in conflict on local issues. Thus, it may be rational to draw
a distinction between the two; but, as the Court said in Reynolds, all
these deviations must be valid in light of the basic standard of population
equality.
EVOLUTION OF THE REYNOLDS STANDARD
in Swann v. Adams, 25 struck down

a Florida reIn 1967, the Court
apportionment plan because the deviations from population equality
therein were not justified by acceptable reasons. 26 The plan, drawn up
by the Florida legislature, provided for 48 senators and 117 representatives. 2 7 The largest deviation in the senate was 25.65% and in the house
was 33.55%. 2 8 The Court, citing Reynolds, said that variations may be

unavoidable, but that the abnormally large deviations in this case were
unwarranted without a satisfactory explanation founded on an acceptable
state policy. 29 Such policy considerations, said the majority, might be to
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. 30 The Court refused, however, to set a standard for maximum deviation, stating that an acceptable
deviation in one state could not be the norm for all other states. 3 ' This
decision indicated the possibility of a separate standard, i.e., more leeway
allowed to state apportionment plans recognizing political boundary lines.
32
Two terms later, the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick v. Priessler
33
and Wells v. Rockefeller struck down two congressional reapportionment
plans. In Kirkpatrick, the population variances from the ideal were only
3.13% and -2.84%. 34 The defendants claimed that these deviations were
de minimis.3 ' The Court responded that there was no set figure that could
be considered de minimis since the whole thrust of the "as nearly as practicable" rationale was inconsistent with fixed percentages. 3 6 Basing their
25 385 U.S. 440 (1967). See Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1966), where a Texas House
plan combining single-member, multimember and floterial districts had an aggregate deviation
of 26.48% (+14.84%, -11.64%). The District Court found that Texas policy allowed for the
violation of county lines in order to surmount undue population variances. The Supreme
Court struck down this plan because the justices were not convinced that the policy of Texas
necessitated the deviations between legislative districts. 386 U.S. at 123.
26 Id. at 444.
27 Id. at 442.
28

Id.

29

Id. at 444.

30

Id.

id. at 445.
394 U.S. 526 (1969).
33 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
34 394 U.S. at 528-29.
35 Id. at 530.
31
32

36

Id.
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decision on Wesberry, the Court said that only limited and unavoidable
variations were acceptable. 3 The Court rejected as justification for the
variances, not only history, economics, and group interests, but also a
state's attempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing
congressional district lines along existing county, municipal and other
subdivision boundaries. 3"
In Wells, a New York plan treated seven sections of the state as homogeneous regions and divided those regions into congressional districts
of equal population. 39 Thirty-one of the 41 congressional districts allotted to
New York were constructed on that basis. 40 The plaintiffs alleged that
under the principle of Wesberry, the statute violated Art. I, § 2, of the
Constitution, and the statute was a systematic partisan gerrymander under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 41 The Court, while not reaching the Fourteenth Amendment claim, held the statute equalizing population only
among the substates unconstitutional, reasoning that Wesberry dictated
that congressional districting must meet the equal protection principle
"as nearly as is practicable." ' 42
Though the two congressional opinions used dicta from Reynolds,
the Court's reasoning in each case was based on Wesberry. There was no
indication in the cases whether a different decision would have been reached
if a state legislative plan had been before the Court. In the Wells case, New
York's justification for the deviations in order to maintain regional lines
was repudiated. Thus, on the one hand, it may appear that the Court
rejected the notion that variances may be permissible where a plan respected boundary lines; but, on the other hand, the Court did not indicate
that these decisions reflected a standard distinct from that employed in
state legislative redistricting.
However, in Ely v. Klah,43 an Arizona reapportionment case, the
Court implied that a single standard was applicable in determining the
validity of both Congressional and state legislative redistricting. 44 Ari31 Id. at 531.
31

Id. at 534.

39 394 U.S. at 547.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.

at 544.

43 403 U.S. 108 (1971).
44 Mr. William Boyd of the National Legislative Conference and Council of State Governments had concluded that the Ely decision meant that "there is one criterion for Congressional
districts and state legislative districts, and that criterion is virtually precise mathematical
equality . . ." National Legislative Conference and Council of State Government, Reapportionment in the States at 2 (1972). But, cf. Hobbs, Book Review, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 659
(1969): "[c]ongressmen are assumed to represent the state as well as their district; state
legislators on the other hand, are expected to be more parochial. Therefore, there is arguably
a better case on the state than on the local level for allowing deviation based on local communities of interest. In addition, on the state level, population variation in one house can be compensated for in the other. This of course is impossible in congressional districting. Id. at
682.
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zona's plan, by guaranteeing each county a representative in the state
legislature's lower house, resulted in a maximum deviation of 16%.
The Court noted that the lower court "properly concluded that this plan
was invalid under Kirkpatrick v. Preisler . . . and Wells v. Rockefeller...

since the legislature had operated on the notion that a 16% deviation was
de minimis and consequently made no effort to achieve greater equality." 45
Whether or not this statement is an indication of one or two standards
is open to question. Reading the opinion one way, it could be assumed
that the Court suggested that a state plan was invalid under the principles
of Kirkpatrick and Wells. Interpreting the decision somewhat differently,
however, the Court may have referred to those cases merely to support
the proposition that the legislature had no right to rely on any deviation
as being de minimis.
LIMITATION OF THE STRICT STANDARD

The strict standard was limited in a 1971 local reapportionment case,
Abate v. Mundt,46 where the Court said that a certain degree of flexibility
in drawing district lines is allowable as long as the goal of population equality
is maintained. Abate involved an apportionment plan for Rockland County,
New York. The plan provided for a county legislature comprised of 18
members to be chosen from five districts. 47 These districts corresponded
to the county's five constituent towns.4 8 The plan, which allowed deviances
of 11.9%, was upheld, with the Court reasoning that local governments
might need more flexibility if they were to meet society's changing needs,
and that a desire to follow political subdivision lines might justify a deviation from numerical equality. 49 The fact that there tended to be fewer
representatives and people in local politics supported the argument that
more flexibility was permissible for local apportionment schemes. 50 The
Court, citing both Reynolds and Swann as support for its holding, accepted the county's deviation because it saw the need for intergovernmental
coordination at the local level; thus, the resulting deviations were supported
by an acceptable state policy. 51 Most significant in this case was the Court's
statement that Rockland County believed it to be an advantage to use the
same individuals to occupy the governing positions of both its counties and
45403 U.S. at 111.
46 403 U.S. 182 (1971). See Recent Decisions, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 692 (197), discussing
Reynolds, Kirkpatrick and Wells, and their possible effect on Abate.
41 Id. at 184.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 185.
50Id. The population equality doctrine had previously been applied to local government
in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), where the Court held that a Commissioner's
Court districting plan dividing the county into four districts, with one district having 95%
of the voters, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 479.
51 Id. at 186.
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towns. 52 In its conclusion, however, the Court warned that these same
not justify substantially greater deviations from population
factors could
53
equality.
Abate indicated that in local reapportionment there is a separate standard allowing small deviations in drawing district lines, as long as the goal
of population equality is maintained. Abate parallels its particular situation to Reynoldsand Swann, but did not specifically say that the opinion
rested on those principles. The emphasis by the Court in Abate upon
justifying deviations due to the close historical relationship between the
county and town is similar to the ties between local units and the state.
Thus, this case might be considered a forerunner to Mahan. Since a different standard is applicable to local apportionment where there is a special
reason to follow political subdivisions, it would not be illogical to apply
that same standard to state apportionment.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there could
be two standards in Connor v. Williams, a Mississippi state reapportionment case.5 4 After striking down a plan which contained a maximum deviation of 26% in the senate, the District Court devised an alternative plan
with an allowable 18.9% deviation in the senate and an 18.7% deviation in
the house.55 The plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to invalidate these
56
deviations based on the decisions handed down in Kirkpatrick and Wells.
The Court said that "(these) decisions do not squarely control the instant
appeal since they do not concern state legislative apportionment, but they
do raise substantial questions concerning the constitutionality57 of the District Court's plan as a design for permanent apportionment."
Viewing Connor, in retrospect, it may be argued that the last half of
the court's statement negated the initial comment. However, it may be
inferred from the Court's language that the principle of Kirkpatrick and
Wells was not to be a controlling factor in state reapportionment. Rather,
an allowable magnitude of deviation was to be the prime concern.
Prior to Mahan, a number of lower court decisions had indicated that 58a
more flexible standard would be applied in state reapportionment.
52

Id.

53 Id. at 187.

404 U.S. 549 (1972).
Id. at 550.
56 id.
57 Id. The Court concluded that since one-fifth of the seats in both houses had already been
elected under a temporary multimember plan devised by the District Court, they would not
consider the application of Wells and Kirkpatrickuntil a final decision with respect to the whole
state was before them. Id. at 551-52.
11 See, e.g., Long v. Docking, 283 F. Supp. 539 (D. Kan. 1968); In re Legislative Districting of General Assembly, Iowa, 193 N.W.2d 784 (S.Ct. Iowa 1971); Troxler v. St. John
the Baptist Police Jury, 331 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. La. 1971); Dunn v. Oklahoma, 343 F.Supp.
320 (W.D. Okla. 1971); and Wold v. Anderson, 335 F. Supp. 962 (D. Mont. 1971). These
cases all held that other considerations were justified in state districting as long as these
considerations were legitimate. The use of political subdivisions was acceptable when such
action was desirable to achieve the goal of population equality.
54
55
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Most prominent of these cases was Jackman v. Bodine,59 where the New
Jersey Supreme Court per Chief Justice Weintraub upheld a state reapportionment plan. The deviations from mathematical equality of assembly
districts had a ratio of 1.5 to 1.60 Chief Justice Weintraub framed the issue
as follows; although population equality receives the primary consideration,
is it possible to accept some other criterion for the drawing of district
lines?6 1 Chief Justice Weintraub answered this question affirmatively,
62
asserting that neither Wells nor Kirkpatrick negated this possibility.
63
These two cases dealt specifically with congressional redistricting.
According to Chief Justice Weintraub, gerrymandering was more of a
problem in state redistricting, and while the use of county and municipal
lines did not foreclose gerrymandering, it did limit it and tended to make
the party responsible for drawing up such a plan more readily accountable
64
at the polls.
Regarding the relationship between political entities and the legislative process, Weintraub stated that a county and a municipality were
meaningful units in state-local governmental relations, and elections
from districts would be more worthwhile if these units were reflected
in a redistricting plan. 65 However, he observed that such deviations,
could 66
be made only if the population discrepancies were within tolerable
limits.
This case, decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Connor,
is a persuasive exposition of the double standard. After the Connor
decision, in Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 67 Chief Justice Weintraub not only
reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Jackman, but observed that the
Connor decision did not undercut his prior reasoning. 68 In Scrimminger,
a plan which was drawn up after the 1970 census contained deviations of
28.83% in the senate and 66.20% in the assembly. 69 Although Chief
Justice Weintraub still thought that his assumption of allowing greater
deviations in state legislative districts was viable, though somewhat suspect after the concluding remarks of the Connor Court, he concluded
that the present plan before the court, contained such substantial devia59 55 N.J. 371, 262 A.2d 389 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
60 Id.
at 381, 262 A.2d at 395. The citizen's vote in one district was worth one and one-half
times as much as someone's vote in another district.
61 Id. at 378, 262 A.2d at 393.
62

Id.

63

55 N.J. at 379, 262 A.2d 393.

64 Id.
65 Id., 262 A.2d at 394.
66 Id.
at 381, 262 A.2d at 395. Chief Justice Weintraub did not say what these limits
would be. He simply stated that the ratio in this instance, 1.5 to 1, was not "inherently bad."
Id. at 382.
67 60 N.J. 483, 291 A.2d 134 (1972).
68 id. at 492, Id. at 291 A.2d at 139.
69 Id. at 493, 291 A.2d at 140.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1974

9

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1974], Art. 13
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
tions as to render it invalid.70
By late 1972, the decisions governing state reapportionment were in
a state of flux. The cases from the Supreme Court had been less than conclusive. Indications of two standards emanated from Reynolds, while
Ely appeared to suggest a single standard. However, Abate set down the
fundamental reasoning for a more lenient standard, and the dicta in Connor,
if weighed, suggests a different standard for state apportionment. These
two cases, however, did not establish two standards. It was not until 1973
that Chief Justice Weintraub's delineation of two standards was followed
by the Supreme Court.
THE MAHAN AND GAFFNEY OPINIONS

The Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mahan v. Howell7 per
Mr. Justice Rehnquist. The Court upheld despite the plaintiff's claim of
an equal protection violation, a 16.4% deviation in the House of Delegates.
Its decision was premised on the grounds that the deviation was not excessive and that it resulted from the state's rational
objective of pre72
serving the integrity of political subdivision lines.
Justice Rehnquist summarized the issues before the Court in the following manner:
The principal question thus presented is whether or not the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise permits
only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite
a good faith effort to achieve absolute
equality, in the context of
73
state legislative reapportionment.
Simply stated, the answer was no. Comparing Reynolds to Wesberry,
Rehnquist concluded that state and congressional reapportionment did
not come under identical standards. Rather, differences were based upon
considerations articulated in Reynolds.7 4 He felt that applying the "absolute equality" standard to state legislative reapportionment would hinder
the functional relationships between state and local governments. 75 It
was noted that Art. II, §§ 2 and 3 of the Virginia Constitution gave the
Assembly power to enact special legislation with regard to political subdivisions. Thus, the redistricting statute sought to preserve subdivisions
in order to effect such legislation.76 Though the state did not need to show
a necessity to adhere to political subdivision lines, a plan, however "ra77
tional" it might be, could not overshadow the goal of substantial equality.
Id.
93 S.Ct. 979 (1973).
72 Id. at 980.
73 93 S. Ct. at 983.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 984.
76 Id.
71 Id. at 986.
70

71
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The final inquiry was whether or not the deviations were so large as to
exceed any permissible limits. In comparing Mahan to Swann, Kilgarlin,
and Reynolds, Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted that the Virginia plan contained
minor deviations as compared to the variations in those cases. 78 Though
there could be no set formula to fix permissible deviations, the population
discrepancies in this case, though approaching tolerable limits, did not
surpass such limits.7 9
The majority opinion, therefore, established two standards for redistricting-first, a strict "absolute equality" standard for congressional
redistricting, and second, a somewhat more flexible standard for redistricting based on a rational state interest. However, a plan might contain
deviations so large as to render it invalid regardless of the justification
for such deviations.
In his partial dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan argued that the case should
be decided by the "as nearly as practicable" standard set forth in Kirkpatrick, Swann, Reynolds, Davis and Sincock. 80 He also suggested that the

facts of the case revealed an actual discrepancy of 23.6% and that deviations of comparable size had led the Court to void state plans in Swann
and Kilgarlin. 8s At any rate, even the 16.4% deviation accepted by the
majority, Brennan stated, should have been sufficient to invalidate the
plan. 12 He felt that the state must present a highly justifiable case of necessity for adhering to political subdivision lines. 8 3 The most important
goal, he argued, was equal representation. 8 4 Accordingly, only when
equality could not be achieved without jeopardizing some critical governproper.85 Justifiable reasons could be
mental interest were deviations
86
Abate.
in
found
similar to those
The fact that Wells and Kirkpatrick dealt with congressional reapportionment did not in Brennan's opinion exempt the states from observing the
principles articulated therein. 87 Although he conceded that there were
differences between congressional and state redistricting, the Court had
never before held that there were two standards, 8 and Mr. Justice Brennan
11Id. at 987.
79 Id.

s0 Id. at 990.

81Id. at 991. This figure was approved by the plaintiffs' computations taking into account
deviations in the floterial districts. The Court decided not to get into a mathematical squabble
and used the 16.4% figures since the lower court based its decision on that figure. Mahan
v. Howell, 93 S.Ct. at 982, n. 6.
82

Id. at 992.

83 Id.
84

Id.

85 Id. at 993.
16 Id. Mr. Justice Brennan did not state what reasons could justify deviations. The Court
in Abate emphasized the long tradition and need for intergovernmental coordination in Rockland County as acceptable state policy, see notes 49 and 52 supra.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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felt that the differences were not substantial enough to call for two different standards. 89 The prior decisions merely stated that certain factors
had more relevance in state redistricting. States could point to other interest in attempting to justify deviations from substantial equality, but this
did not mean that the states were subject to a lighter standard. 90 In his
opinion, Virginia had not proved a need to insure representation of political subdivisions or a need to use county boundaries in the drawing
of its districts.9 1
Brennan's dissent must be considered in light of the Court's previous
cases. Reynolds clearly suggested that in state reapportionment certain
special factors allowed state legislators more leeway. Abate, the foundation
case for two standards, Brennan conceded, signaled a departure from the
"absolute equality" rule. Hence, if a different standard could be applied to
local units on the basis of the special factors arising from relationships
within the state, it would logically follow that the similar local-state relationships should be guided by the same standard.
Gaffney v. Cummings,92 decided on June 18, 1973,'added another step
to the retreat from the one standard principle which Mahan initiated. The
case concerned a 1971 state reapportionment plan for Connecticut.
The plan provided for 36 single-member senatorial districts, creating a
maximum total deviation of 1.81%, and for 151 single-member House seats
creating a maximum deviation of 7.83%. 93 The plan was subsequently
attacked as a political gerrymander in favor of the Republican party which
94
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The District Court held that the deviations were not justifiable and that the
plan denied equal protection of the law to voters in the districts of greater
95
population.
The Supreme Court, in the opinion of Mr. Justice White who wrote
the majority opinion, decided that minor deviations in state legislative
redistricting did not constitute a prima facie violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 96 Citing Mahan, the Court reemphasized the fact that since
there were differences between state and congressional representation, a
different standard was applicable to each. 97 State reapportionment cases
prior to Mahan involved such large deviations that they could not be
justified by any means, and Mahan demonstrated that population devia" Id.
90

Id.

at 995.
93 S.Ct. 2321 (1973). A bipartisan commission consisting of four democrats and four
republicans failed to draw up a plan. Finally, the plan was drawn up by a three-man bipartisan board.
93 93 S.Ct. at 2323.
94 Id. at 2324.
' 341 F.Supp. 139, 148 (D. Conn. 1972).
96 93 S.Ct. at 2325.
91 Id. at 2325-26.
9!

Id.

92
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tions might be significant yet still justifiable. 98 Thus, Mr. Justice White
concluded that in state reapportionment where the population equality
goal did not depend upon the elimination of small variances, no justification
was necessary.

99

Taken together, Mahan and Gaffney indicate a retreat from the strict
"one man, one vote" principle initiated almost a decade earlier. Mahan
established the principle that consistent with the dictates of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, a state's redistricting
plan could contain certain deviations if justified by acceptable state policies.
This conclusion rested upon special factors inherent in the formulation
of state or local lines that required flexibility regardless of the strict standards established for legislators engaging in congressional redistricting.
Thus, only congressional districts were required to be "as nearly equal
as practicable."
Thus, the Gaffney decision is a corollary of the double standard, i.e.,
even if there are no justifications alleged by a state to uphold its redistricting
plan, the plan will still be valid if the Court determines that the variances
are small enough as not to obviate the goal of population equality. The
Gaffney decision is a little more difficult to accept since all the prior cases,
including Mahan, required at least some justification. All that the Court
was able to point to in Gaffney was carefully selected dicta from previous
cases. The Court also stated that the precise question of de minimus
variations in state reapportionment cases had never been before them. 100
The decision, however, may not have been all that surprising considering
the retreat initiated in Mahan. However, the fact that the Court was willing
to allow certain large deviations where justified should not indicate that
certain smaller unjustified deviations can be allowed. 0 1
In Mahan, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, citing Kirkpatrick and Abate, stated
that the "dichotomy" between the state and congressional cases has been
consistently maintained. 10 2 As discussed above, an examination of these
particular cases as to whether or not there were two distinct standards
reveals no definite answer. Based on a case by case analysis, Chief Justice
Weintraub, however, was able to discern two standards. His decisions
in Jackman and Scrimminger, even though they were never decided by
91 id. at 2329. Mr. Justice White reasoned that mathematical precision is not practical
because of the inaccuracies of census data. Census is taken at one given time and it does not
measure growth rates, mobility rates, and ineligible voters. Thus, since total population is
not an accurate measuring stick of the weight of one's vote, slight variances do not obviate
equality. Gaffney v. Cumming, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (1973). See R. L. Morril, Lampadephoria
On Criteria for Redistricting, 48 WASH. L. REV., 847, 850 (1973). But see notes 133-134
infra.
99 Id.
100

id. at 2326.

101Certain deviations are so large that they are invalid under any standard. See note 98

supra.

10193 S.Ct. at 984.
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the Supreme Court not cited by that Court, presaged the new double standard in apportionment.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE NEW DOUBLE STANDARD
Equal protection requires that all individuals similarly situated must
be treated equally.' 03 A state legislature, however, can create certain
classifications among individuals, but these classifications and resulting
deviations from perfect equality must be measured and appropriately
weighed.
One standard (the reasonable or rational test) used by the Court questions whether or not the legislation considered is reasonably or rationally
related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 104 A more comprehensive review
is taken by the Court where the statute affects one's fundamental rights
or is inherently suspect. 10 5 In this case, the state must show that the
resulting inequality is necessary for a compelling state interest. 10 6
This second "stepped-up" stand is applied where the interest 07is one that
requires close safeguarding, such as race, religion or alienage. 1
The right to vote has been characterized as fundamental. 108 Accordingly,
any impairment of this right has been subjected to close scrutiny.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 09 suits were brought by

Virginia residents to declare Virginia's poll tax unconstitutional. The Court
agreed with the plaintiffs' complaint that the conditioning of the right to
vote on the payment of a fee or tax violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 110 Virginia violated the Constitution because it could not classify voter qualifications according to the affluence
of the voter. The court said that the interest of the state in fixing voter
qualifications had no relation to wealth or the paying of a tax."' The right to
vote, the Court concluded, is too fundamental to be so burdened. 112 Another
case, Williams v. Rhodes,' 1 3 dealt with the question of whether the right
103 See Tussman and TenBroek, The Equal Protection of Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
344 (1949); Note, Development in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065-1192
(1969).
14 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 402 (1927).
105 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
106 Id., n. 4.
107 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
100 304 U.S. at 152, n. 4; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

109 383 U.S. 663 (1965).
110 Id. at 665.
"Id.

at 666.

Id. at 670.
113393 U.S. 23 (1968). Ohio statutes required new parties to obtain signatures totalling
15% of the number of ballots cast in the last gubernatorial elections while allowing the old
parties to retain their ballot positions by obtaining 10% of the voters in the last gubernatorial
election. The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes denied to the new parties and to the voters who
might wish to vote for them the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 25-26.
I
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to vote is denied where statutory requirements make it difficult for a new
party to obtain a ballot position. The Court held that the statutes placed
a burden on the right of voters to cast their votes effectively for those of
their political persuasion. 114 Allowing the state to favor established parties
over new by virtually denying new parties the opportunity for a ballot
position, the Court concluded, conditioned the right to vote, without a
showing of any "compelling interest." 1 5
In apportionment, the problem is that the vote has been diluted. Whether
the dilution of one's vote is a significant enough impairment of that basic
right to be subject to a stricter scrutiny is the issue at hand. The right to
vote is infringed where one cannot cast his vote effectively for the party
of his choice and where one cannot cast his vote effectively because it
has been diluted. The opportunity for equal participation for all voters is
denied when one cannot vote because of a poll tax, or because his party is
denied the ballot, and when the weight of one's vote is under-represented.
Where the right to vote is diluted, that right is not the same as the right of
the voter whose vote is overvalued. Since the eligible voter cannot be
prohibited from voting, his vote can no more be destroyed in part by giving
another voter a more effective right. Under this analysis
the dilution of
16
one's vote should be subject to the stricter standard."
The Court in Mahan said that a state redistricting plan was not subject
to the stringent standards of Wells and Kirkpatrick, but should follow the
equal protection test of Reynolds."' Extracting dicta from Reynolds,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the test was one of rationality
under the equal protection clause.""
An examination of Reynolds reveals that the Court did indicate that
deviations from equality are permissible so long as the divergences are
incident to a rational state policy. 119 The Court, however, also emphasized
that the judicial inquiry focused upon whether or not there was an unconstitutional impairment of one's right to vote.' 20 The Court noted that
the right to vote is a "fundamental matter" and such a right can be denied
by its dilution just as effectively as by prohibiting its exercise.' 2 1 Accordingly, it should follow that the dilution of one's vote "impairs basic
constitutional rights" and "since the right to exercise the franchise is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement
of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scru22
tinized."
114

Id. at 30.

at 31.
Note, Beyond Wesberry: State Apportionment and Equal Protection, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 264 (1964).
MI93 S.Ct. at 985.
118 Id. at 986.
119 377 U.S. at 579.
120 Id. at 561.
121 Id. at 555.
122 Id. at 562.
15 Id.

' See,
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Taken in a broad perspective, the Court's language in Reynolds implied a concern that malapportionment denies, to a certain extent, one's
right to vote. Nevertheless, the Court indicated that malapportionment
might be justified if it serves to effectuate a "rational state policy." In
fact, the Court in its concluding remarks on equal protection said that
"careful judicial scrutiny" must be given in evaluating state apportionment
schemes, but that a state can accord some legislative representation to
if such a plan is in compliance with a clearly "rational
political subdivisions
23
state policy."'1
It appears more logical, however, to say that the emphasis of Reynolds
indicated that a stepped-up standard is applicable in reapportionment
cases, because the denial of one's right to vote is effectuated through its
dissipation. Later cases, however, evidenced the confusion as to which
standard was to be applied. Swann, whether it used the rational standard
or not as a basis for its decision, quoted the "rational state policy" phrase
from Reynolds. 2 4 Kilgarlin invalidated a Texas plan because the Court
12 5
was not convinced the state's reasoning necessitated the deviations.
In Abate, the Court said that since "voting rights require highly sensitive
safeguards this Court has carefully scrutinized state interests offered to
justify deviations from population equality."1' 2 6 Chief Justice Weintraub,
who read the pre-Mahan line of cases as evidencing a two standard review,
stated in Jackman that it was clear from Reynolds that even a state legislative reapportionment plan must be more than rational. 127 Hence, Mahan
and Gaffney are28 not in accord with the view of equal protection expressed
1
in prior cases.
Thus, it is suggested that Mahan and Gaffney are inconsistent, with
prior case law which has suggested that impairment of the right to vote
through malapportionment can be justified only if necessary to uphold
a critical state interest. The only support these cases can rely on is the
"rational state policy" phrase from Reynolds. 1 29 As indicated, that phrase
is outweighed by other arguments throughout the opinion. Consequently,
Mahan and Gaffney taken together imply that a state may significantly
123 Id. at 581. In the companion case of Roman v. Sincock, 377. U.S. 695 (1964), the Court
said that the District Court properly concluded that Art. 11, § 2 of the Delaware Constitution,
which establishes apportionment, was unconstitutional because the court found "no rational
Id. at 701.
or reasonable basis for the Delaware apportionment.
124 385 U.S. at 44.
125See note 25 supra.
126 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1973).
12755 N.J. 371, 381.
124 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), dealing with the constitutionality of filing
fees, where the Court said that that burden on voting did not require the use of the strict
scrutiny test as did the dilution of one's vote, citing Reynolds and Wesberry in a footnote.
Id. at 143; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1965). (Strict scrutiny
citing Reynolds).
12.See Mahan v. Howell, 93 S.Ct. at 985; Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S.Ct. at 2326.
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impair, through reapportionment, one's right to vote (by dilution) if such
reapportionment is supported by a rational state policy. Moreover, the right
to vote may be somewhat impaired (i.e. minor deviations in district populations) without any justification whatsoever.
Also, the holding in Gaffney--4hat certain percentage deviations are
per se de minimus and thus do not require any justification whateverappears completely inconsistent with prior opinions dealing with reapportionment and equal protection. In fact, this rationale had been completely rejected in Kirkpatrick.130 The Court states in Gaffney that since
the goal is the protection of one's vote from substantial dilution compared
to the vote of another citizen, that goal cannot possibly be impaired by
allowing certain minor deviations. 131 The inaccuracies of census figures
reapportionment is based allowed the Court to draw its conupon which
32
clusion. 1
The same reliance on census population was urged by the State of
Missouri in Kirkpatrick, and was expressly rejected. The Court said that
even if there is a difference between total population and eligible voter
population, Missouri had made no attempt to estimate the eligible voter
population and apportion on that basis. 1 33 In response to the argument
that the deviations gave weight to on-going population shifts, the Court
said that the states could properly take this into account if the population
substantial documentation
shifts were being accurately predicted, with
1 34
state.
the
throughout
systematically
applied
The Court's rationale in Gaffney is that since a dichotomy exists between state and congressional redistricting, and because in Mahan it
was held that some amount of deviation could be justified by a rational
state interest, it was recognized that in the state context, minor deviations
need not be accounted for. Assuming the rational standard applies due
to certain special factors inherent in state government, the argument appears sound that more flexibility in state redistricting is needed. In the context of allowing de minimis variations, however, certain special factors
which allowed more leeway in state redistricting are not present. Clearly,
nothing is unique in a census population used for state redistricting that
differs from a census population used for congressional redistricting. In
Reynolds, the Court emphasized that a state might want to follow political
subdivision lines since much of the state's legislative activity could be aimed
at particular subdivisions. There is no rational purpose, however, which a
state might consider as applicable only to its level of government as distinct
from congressional reapportionment in the context of allowing de minimis
deviations.
130 See note 36 supra.

131 93 S.Ct. at 2327.
132See note 98 supra.
133 394 U.S. at 534-35.
'34 394 U.S. at 535.
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It could be argued that even if the Court's reasoning in creating a dichotomy between state and congressional redistricting cannot be applied
to de minimis variations, such population discrepancies should be allowed.
Precise mathematical equality is not required among district populations.
Therefore, it would appear proper if states took other factors into consideration as long as fair and effective representation is maintained. Such factors
could include grouping together voters who share a set of special state or
local interests. For example, one approach might be to keep people who
belong to a neighborhood political club in a single legislative district. If
these people could be represented by the same legislators, with de minimis
deviation, then such a plan, without other evidence, would appear to be

neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Otherwise, a hypothetical farmer
redistricted into an urban area in the name of population equality might
find himself without a farm-oriented representative to act in his behalf.
Though these arguments may be valid in support of state redistricting
along political subdivision lines, they have no merit in upholding de minimis
deviations. To pick certain deviation percentages as being de minimus
contravenes the logic of the Reynolds rationale where the Court said that
what may be an acceptable deviation in one state may be unsatisfactory
in another. 135 To allow de minimis deviations would, as the Court observed in Kirkpatrick, "encourage legislators to strive for that range rather

than for (the goal of) equality

.

.

.136

This would relegate the equality

goal to a secondary status.
As previously indicated, the new double standard created by Mahan
can be supported by certain dicta from prior opinions, 137 and is justified
by the fact that in state legislative redistricting, certain special factors
not present in congressional redistricting require flexibility. 138 Allowing
minor deviations without justifications, however, is neither consistent with
prior decisions 13 9 nor justified in any way by special facts. It is suggested
135377 U.S. at 578.
136394 U.S. at 531.
'37See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,
185 (1971). See note 139 infra and accompanying text.
138 In a memorandum decision, the Court, with Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice White
dissenting, vacated and remanded an Idaho District Court decision allowing a 19.4% deviation from the ideal population in state legislative districts. Summers v. Cenarussa, 93 S.Ct.
3037 (1973).
139 See Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 1081(1971), where the Court indicated that the lower court
was proper in invalidating a state plai where the legislature operated on the notion that the
deviation was de minimis. Id. at Ill. In Sims v. Amos, 336 F.Supp. 924 (M.D.A.La. 1972),
aff'd. Amos v. Sims, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), of the four plans drawn up by the State of Alabama,
the plan with the least deviation was 28.65% in the House and 25.98% in the Senate. The court
invalidated all four plans. To the issue of whether there can be a per se de minimis deviation,
the court looked to the principles of kirkpatrick, and said that "with respect to state apportionment no amount of deviation should be considered per se de minimis." Id. at 933. Against
the state's argument that the variances were necessary to preserve county lines, the court
said that political subdivisions may be recognized in the state apportionment context (citing
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that while the decision in Mahan140 could be accepted as a logical extension of Reynolds, the decision in Gaffney, because its effect could possibly result in the negation of population equality as the paramount goal
of reapportionment,1 4 1 is entirely inconsistent with prior opinions which
applied the requirement of equal protection to reapportionment.
IRWIN RUBIN

The Palestinian J*'g6%l People and Their

Political, Military and Legal Status in the World Community
...His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use
their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object,
it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine ....I
• . .This right ("of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own

country") was recognised in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd
November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League
of Nations. We hereby affirm both, which, in particular, give international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish
people and Eretz-Isreal and
to the right of the Jewish people to
2
rebuild its National Home.
...

We do not consider the Arabs of the land an ethnic community

3
nor a people with a distinct national character.
The Lord 4giveth and the Lord taketh away. Praised be the name of
the Lord.
During the long winter following the most recent Middle Eastern conflict many Westerners have asked poignant questions for the first time.
Reynolds and Abate). Population is controlling and these other factors are not justifiable where
there are substantially greater deviations. Id. at 934. But cf. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S.
542, 553-556 (Justice White dissenting).
140 This takes for granted the fact that the rational test is applicable in state apportionment
cases. Of course, if the test is one of strict scrutiny, only the "absolute equality" principle
would be acceptable in all cases.
4'Since there is a fixed valid deviation, this leaves open the possibility whether or not
proof may be admitted that population was not the prime goal of the legislators.
Quoted from the text of the Balfour Declaration, appearing in

STEIN,

THE

BALFOUR

DECLARATION (961 ).
2 ISRAEL, LAWS, STATUTES, ETC.,

Laws of the State of Israel (authorized trans.) (Tel
Aviv, 1948). This passage is of particular significance as it is quoted from Israel's Declaration of Independence.
3 "An Open Letter to Y. Gaili," Arab World XV, no. 9 (1969) at 3.
4JOB 1:21.
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